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Chapter 6
Community in Fragments
Reading Relation in the 
Fragments of Heraclitus
Carrie Giunta
A recent debate considers the question of the first philosophers—who were 
they and where did they come from? Citing a long history of written docu-
mentation, a Western tradition of philosophy claims the pre-Socratics, Greek 
thinkers of the sixth and fifth centuries BC, were the first philosophers. Some 
modern philosophers believe that the first philosophers came from Egypt. 
A dearth of evidence of Egyptian philosophy from the pre-Socratics’ time 
period, however, is not due to an absence of thought, but from a lack of 
recorded literature. How can the role of Egyptian scholars in early Greek 
thinking be determined if there are no remaining Egyptian philosophy texts?
This chapter will address a question of interrelation between philosophy 
from ancient Greece and philosophy from ancient Egypt. I argue this relation 
was Egyptian and Greek at the same time, forming a transnational philo-
sophical community that was not joined by national or social identity, but by 
philosophy. This would mean Greek philosophy and Egyptian philosophy are 
not separate, based on identity or difference. It rather de-emphasizes separa-
tion and identity. In approaching this question, I will use a close reading of 
pre-Socratic texts, which reveal a harmony and connection in Heraclitus frag-
ments that is key to traditional African philosophies such as ubuntu. 
With little surviving textual output from Egypt during this time, it is not 
possible to speculate on the community this may have formed in respect to 
the sociocultural conditions of the day. My close reading of pre-Socratic texts 
will illuminate what evidence for a transnational philosophical community is 
detectable at the textual-exegetic level. 
I will question a notion of European self-understanding that presupposes 
a culture and philosophy founded in Greece. These questions challenge 
a unitary theory of European identity as well as hybrid views, in which a 
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non-European tradition contaminates a European one. This will engage 
debates about identity in response to global community. 
The problem with opposing Eurocentric and non-Eurocentric views, 
I argue, is that both approaches presuppose a mono-genealogy of European 
intellectual and cultural origin. In this chapter, global community is not based 
on identity, unity, or difference, but on relation and harmony.
Reading pre-Socratic fragments as harmony and relation reveals an ancient 
philosophy not focused on separating community into one thing or another. 
The Heraclitus fragments I will discuss express interrelationship and con-
nectedness by creating opposition. Whereas in current debates about global 
community and Western values, opposition is a struggle in which one side 
dominates the other, in my reading of Heraclitus fragments, there is “hidden 
harmony” instead of struggle. This harmony forms a type of relation in which 
two things can be separate and together at the same time.
BLACK SOCRATES AND BLACK ATHENA
Simon Critchley, in his article, “Black Socrates? Questioning the philo-
sophical tradition,”1 engages a vexed and intricate debate over philosophy’s 
indigenousness to Europe. Critchley agrees with the unpopular position that 
philosophy was not founded exclusively in Greece as is upheld in the philo-
sophical tradition. Asserting that Greek history rather traces its philosophy 
to ancient Egyptian wisdom traditions2 and citing Martin Bernal’s tenden-
tious three volumes entitled, Black Athena, Critchley challenges a tradition 
of philosophy that places Greece3 as its origin and the Greeks as the first 
philosophers. 
Critchley considers Bernal’s argument, which holds that in Europe, up 
until the early nineteenth century, the philosophical tradition accepted Greek 
philosophy was imported from Egypt. This narrative was systematically sup-
pressed in the late 1800s and disappeared from European historiography. This 
is linked, says Bernal, to nineteenth-century European colonialism. In this 
way, he draws a connection between “the dismissal of the Egyptians and the 
explosion of Northern European racism in the nineteenth century.”4 The book 
and its author were attacked by academics for its “Afro-centrism” and con-
demned for lacking in evidence and rigor.5 The debate, however, continues.
Ample discussion can be found in the Africa-centric literature about the 
interrelation between ancient Egypt and ancient Greece, which claims Greek 
philosophy’s traceability to Africa,6 particularly Egypt.7 Henry Olela main-
tains ancient Greek philosophy is a product of an Egyptian tradition, which 
is rooted in the traditions of sub-Saharan Africa, mainly Ethiopia, Nubia, 
and Sudan.8 Innocent C. Onywuenyi argues pre-Socratic philosophers were 
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influenced by and taught by priest-philosophers of the Egyptian Mystery 
System. This system of education, run by Egyptian priests, taught a number 
of disciplines known collectively as “the wisdom of the Egyptians.” These 
mystery schools taught philosophy, religion, medicine, law, mathematics, 
geometry, and astronomy to students from Egypt and other parts of Africa, 
Greece, and Asia Minor. Mystery schools, Onywuenyi posits, created the 
prototype for Greek philosophy. He refers to Aristotle, writing in Metaphys-
ics,9 about Egypt as the place where philosophy began.10 In the Timaeus, Plato 
refers to Greek philosophers traveling to Egypt for the purpose of education.11 
Although ancient Egypt is intimated in Aristotle, most scholarship based in 
a philosophical tradition of Europe does not emphasize an actual relation 
between Egypt and Greece. Onywuenyi urges for this scenario to change 
and demands that the history of philosophy be rewritten to the effect that 
Egyptians were the first philosophers and the pre-Socratics studied in Egypt.12
While scholars are at odds over an Africa-centric or Europe-centric founda-
tion of philosophy, Critchley develops one way of overcoming this problem by 
employing a “contrapuntal criticism.”13 He borrows this phrase from Edward 
Said, which Said borrows from classical Western music’s “counterpoint.”14 
A contrapuntal reading takes into account different perspectives and considers 
how these differences are enmeshed, entwined, and interdependent, forming a 
hybrid culture or “hybrid ensemble” as Critchley states.15 Said explains what 
he means by contrapuntal and hybridity in Culture and Imperialism: “All cul-
tures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, het-
erogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated and unmonolithic.”16 What emerges 
as a result of a contrapuntal reading is a hybrid philosophical tradition. An 
extended, contrapuntal reading of philosophical texts would bring together 
the tradition of a Greek origin of philosophy, as nineteenth-century imperial-
ism inaugurated, with Bernal’s resistance to this, in which he holds Egypt as 
the birthplace of philosophy. Critchley’s “deconstructed tradition” questions 
the exclusion of that which is not excludable and asks that the tradition face 
its own hybridity, thus accepting “the failure of its demand for exclusivity.”17
I believe this notion of counterpoint among differences implies hybridity 
of what are not necessarily separate identities, but Egyptian and Greek at 
the same time. I will now consider how this relation forms a transnational 
philosophical connection.
DIUNITAL RELATION
Critchley focuses on the interchange between two opposing views in which 
the contamination of a European tradition by a non-European one constitutes 
a hybrid tradition. The approach I propose is based on relation and questions 
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identity. This relational way does not emphasize origin, purity, or hybrid-
ity. I challenge a presupposition that philosophy was founded exclusively in 
Greece and did not share a philosophical connection with Egypt. I suggest 
rather that philosophers from Egypt and Greece were connected in a transna-
tional philosophical community. Philosophy, then, can be Egyptian and not 
Egyptian, Greek and not Greek or European and not European all at the same 
time. 
This is consonant with a concept of reality in the context of a worldview 
connected with some African cultures to which I will now turn.
Economist Vernon J. Dixon discusses diunital logic, in which things can be 
separate and indissociable; sensory experience is fixed and neutral, but also 
nonfixed and nonneutral. In diunitality, something is divided and undivided 
simultaneously. Dixon constructs the term, di-unital out of “di” or apart and 
“unital,” the adjectival form of unit, to mean that something can be apart and 
united at the same time, where “at the same time” means indissociably.18 
Rather than intertwining differences, as in Critchley’s deconstructed hybrid-
ity, in Dixon’s diunital frame, differences are indissociable. Something can 
be in one category and not in that category; a thing can be both A and not A 
at the same time.19
Did Egypt and Greece diunitally form a philosophical community by 
way of oral distribution of ideas shared among participants in the Egyptian 
Mystery System? Secondary texts do discuss early Greek philosophers’ inter-
action with Egypt, yet I have not found interpretations of pre-Socratic works 
that link these readings with a tradition from Africa.20 My response to this 
gap in the knowledge is to comb the surviving work of pre-Socratic Greek 
philosophers that studied in Egypt, such as Thales, Pythagoras, and Dem-
ocritus21 for traces of evidence. In lieu of texts written by or about Egyptian 
priest-philosophers and what they taught, the only evidence we might have 
is in philosophical texts attributed to Greek pre-Socratic philosophers. These 
texts hold important clues as to an Egyptian Mystery System. This leads to 
the discovery of a transnational philosophical connection between ancient 
Egypt and ancient Greek philosophers. 
Edward Said advises against the replacing of missing narrative from his-
tory. The new reading I propose could potentially become “a mirror opposite 
the writing whose tyranny it disputes.”22 A reading mirroring a Europe-
centric or Africa-centric interpretation would attach a single identity. My 
aim, however, is not to replace Europe-centric readings with Africa-centric 
readings, but to displace traditional approaches with a concern for Greece and 
Egypt’s shared relation that appears absent from the literature. This is not a 
critique of European philosophy, but an attempt to expand understanding of 
the very tradition. I will explore the fragments of pre-Socratic philosopher 
Heraclitus and how this work has been interpreted. 
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Heraclitus lived during the fifth century B.C. in Ephesus in Iona on Asia 
Minor. The only biography on Heraclitus was written by Diogenes Laertius in 
the third century A.D.23 According to this biography, Heraclitus wrote a book 
entitled, On Nature. No book, however, remains. T. M. Robinson explains 
Heraclitus’ works vary from direct quotations to personal accounts recon-
structed from memory.24 Originally, the work of Heraclitus may have been 
spoken and then written down at a later time. What we have are fragments of 
his work that are removed from their original context. Their context, argue 
John Sallis and Kevin Maly, may have been “a further written discourse. . .a 
further spoken discourse, or merely a situation in which the saying was 
uttered.”25 Classical scholar G. S. Kirk observes Heraclitus fragments do not 
appear to be extracted from a written work, but as “oral pronouncements put 
into. . .an easily memorable form.”26 T. M. Robinson explains Heraclitus’ 
works vary from direct quotations to personal accounts reconstructed from 
memory. Kirk sees the fragments mainly as “isolated statements.” “It is pos-
sible,” says Kirk, “that Heraclitus wrote no book, in our sense of the word.”27
A fragment, like a proverb, is a quotation of an author’s spoken words. 
Like African proverbs, which form part of an oral literature, rooted in the 
proverbs, folksongs, folktales, art, and rituals,28 fragments are transmitted by 
word of mouth, and not by the written word. Others recounted the fragments 
one by one. Sources of the fragments are found in the works of Plato, Aris-
totle, Cratylus, and Theophrasus. Later, authors such as the Stoics, Christian 
writers and neoplatonists were dependent upon the earlier sources. These 
later authors include Sextus Empiricus, Marcus Aurelius, Plutarch, Hippoly-
tus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Diogenes Laertius, Plotinus, Porphyry, 
and Proclus.29
HARMONY IN OPPOSITION
I will focus on Heraclitus fragments B50 and 51, which discuss logos in the 
context of Heraclitus’ recurring theme, the “unity of opposites.” In the unity 
of opposites, knowing something’s opposite begets knowledge of the thing. 
In fragments B50 and B51, Heraclitus’s unity of opposites converges with the 
theme of harmony. In harmony, opposites have a special connection. As Kirk 
explains, opposites are connected in that they are not really disconnected.30
For instance, Heraclitean fragment 10, sourced from Aristotle’s De Mundo 
states, “Things taken together are whole and not whole, something which is 
being brought together and brought apart, which is in tune and out of tune: out 
of all things can be made a unity, and out of a unity, all things.”31
Kirk discusses the unity of opposites as a balance between the opposites.32 
Aristotle posits a balance between opposites in his citation of Heraclitus 
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fragment B8, “Heraclitus said that what opposes unites, and that the finest 
attunement stems from things bearing in opposite directions, and that all 
things come about by strife.”33 In this interpretation of fragment B8, Aristotle 
mentions making opposites harmonious, paraphrasing another fragment—
Heraclitus fragment B51. 
In order to examine the harmony of opposites Heraclitus sets forth, I will 
discuss fragments B51 and B50, in particular. These two specific fragments, 
I argue, suggest a musical lineage that has not been explored in previous 
interpretations.34 Fragments B50 and B51 are part of a group of fragments 
sourced from Hippolytus, Book 9 of Refutation of All Heresies. Fragments 
B50 through B67 come from this one source by Hippolytus. I have chosen 
to focus my examination on two fragments from this source because they 
provide cogent depictions of the harmony of opposites. Other fragments from 
this source address a similar theme. For instance, fragment B60 states, “The 
road up [and] down [is] one and the same [road]” and fragment B59, “The 
way of writing is straight and crooked.”35 Fragments B50 and B51 make 
similar observations about opposites in unity, however, they deal specifically 
with harmony and attunement.
Counter to Heraclitus, Plato, in Symposium,36 considers harmony as refer-
ring to agreement and not to things that are varying. “It is perfectly absurd 
to speak of a harmony at variance, or as formed from things still varying.”37 
Read from Plato’s perspective, what is different cannot be the same and 
agreement at variance does not make for a reasonable argument, thus render-
ing Heraclitus fragments B50 and B51 nonsensical. In providing alternative 
readings of the two fragments, I will reveal an unknown musical relation in 
Heraclitus based on harmony and antiphony that recalls some African world-
views based on harmony and community. This discussion will begin with 
existing interpretations of logos in Heraclitus fragment B50.
RETHINKING LOGOS
I connect Heraclitus fragment B50 with the theme of antiphonic dialogue or 
“call and response” and antiphony, used in traditional African worldviews as 
discussed by Charles Hersch and Geneva Smitherman. This investigation will 
begin with several interpretations of the same short piece of text, Heraclitus’s 
Fragment B50.
Here is the fragment interpreted by Kirk:38
Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree. . .that all things are one
T.M. Robinson’s version is as follows:39
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Not after listening to me, but after listening to the account, one does wisely in 
agreeing (homologein) that all things are (in fact) one (thing), [says Heraclitus]
John Burnet interprets Fragment B50 by:40
It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my Word, and to confess that all things 
are one.
Logos can mean account, word, meaning, reason, truth, law, statement, 
assertion, discourse, or Being.41 Some interpreters such as Burnet trans-
late logos as the “word” of or the discourse of Heraclitus himself.42 This 
interpretation poses difficulty when considering Fragment B50, because, as 
G. S. Kirk observes, logos is distinguished from the speaker here. According 
to Kirk, logos is not a reference to Heraclitus’s own word or discourse. When 
Heraclitus says not to listen to him, this “should not of course be taken as 
prohibiting men from listening to Heraclitus, rather it implies that his words 
have an absolute authority from outside.”43Logos involves something external 
to himself, which a closer reading of Heraclitean fragments B50 and B51 will 
reveal.
Martin Heidegger and Eugene Fink give these two alternative 
interpretations:44
If you have heard not me but rather the logos, then it is wise to say accordingly, 
“all is one.”
When you have listened, not merely to me (the speaker), but rather when you 
maintain yourselves in hearkening attunement, then there is proper hearing.
Heidegger deals at length with Heraclitus and early Greek thinking. In an 
early discussion, Heidegger posits logos has an affinity to legein, to speak or to 
say, whose original meaning is, “to disclose and make manifest.”45In an essay 
written in 1954,46 he approaches the riddle of logos by investigating the pos-
sible meanings of legein. Heidegger asks how the meaning of legein as “the 
laying-down and laying-before, which gathers itself and others” comes also to 
mean saying and talking. He asks, what lies in legein as laying? To examine 
this question, Heidegger summons the image of a plantation of grapevines at 
harvest time, when grapes are gathered and laid down in shelter. In his inves-
tigation, he determines that to lay “is concerned with retaining whatever is 
laid down as lying before us.”47 What lies together is sheltered (the grapes are 
stored securely) in unconcealment. The letting-lie-before, laid in unconceal-
ment, comes together into presence.48 Then, leaving the vineyard, Heidegger 
answers the question, what actually lies in the laying? What lies in the laying 
is “everything present in unconcealment.” Since everything unconcealed is 
saying, what lies in the laying is what arises when language is spoken.
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Although Heidegger makes the case that the unconcealment of what is 
concealed, the presencing of what is present brings about the speaking of 
language, there are, however, meanings of the root of legein, Ȝȑ(Ȗ)Ȧ, that he 
does not consider. He focuses on the meaning of legein as talking or saying 
and as laying. He sees legein as holding the key to the meaning of logos: 
“What logos is we gather from legein” and logos means legein “as a say-
ing aloud.”49 Yet, he does not consider the meanings of Ȝȑ(Ȗ)Ȧ: to say, tell; 
recite, sing; call, name.50 Does Heidegger overlook this meaning? Thinking 
of the logos as a song, a call, or a recitation, reveals a musical thread running 
through Fragment B50, which could provide further clues to understanding 
Heraclitus’s fragments. This root meaning of logos is not merely musically 
oriented; it is specifically a calling or singing. 
Though Heidegger gives no explanation for why he chooses the grape 
gathering metaphor to propound his theory that “saying is a letting-lie-
together-before which gathers and is gathered,”51 his reference to the har-
vest is indicative of an enduring relationship between agriculture and song. 
Singing has accompanied cultivation ever since early farming practices. Ted 
Gioia’s research on work songs reveals that agricultural work songs are “the 
oldest surviving secular songs from ancient Egypt.”52 Greek farmers sang 
work songs while toiling in the vineyards and grain fields.53 In the Iliad, for 
instance,54 Homer describes the shield of Achilles, which depicts a vineyard 
with grape gatherers working while a youth plays the harp (or lyre) and sings. 
They are depicted toiling, singing, dancing, and whistling to the music. This 
supports both the grape gathering metaphor and my assertion that Fragment 
B50 has musical undertones. Thus, logos has a musical connotation, as the 
work song that laborers sing together. This musical, oral, rather than written 
aspect in pre-Socratic work could be an important clue as to how a commu-
nity of philosophers formed in ancient Egypt and Greece. In my reading of 
Fragment B50, this group singing involves a back-and-forth movement in a 
mutual interaction of call and response.
CALL AND RESPONSE
In antiphony, a type of polyphony also known as “call and response,” 
speaker and listener’s voices alternate back and forth in a conversational pat-
tern (Hersch 2007:139).55 The Greek, antiphon, ਕȞĲȓĳȦȞȠȞ, means “sounding 
in answer, responsive to.”56 The ਕȞĲȓ denotes opposition, opposite situation, 
replacement, reciprocation, equivalence, negation, posteriority. ĳȦȞȒ means 
voice, cry, or shout.57
The communication depicted in the fragment is antiphonic in that Hera-
clitus describes a movement connecting speakers and listeners through call 
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and response. Fragment B50 emphasizes a call to hearkeners, asking them to 
listen to and respond to something that will culminate in a sense of unity. In 
call and response, a speaker calls out and listeners respond directly to the call. 
It is a process that involves “spontaneous verbal and non-verbal interaction 
between speaker and listener in which all of the speaker’s statements (‘calls’) 
are punctuated by expressions (‘responses’) from the listener.”58
In a call and response scenario, two distinguishable phrases are uttered. 
One phrase is a call coming from a speaker and one phrase is a response to 
the call by listeners. I propose that in Fragment B50, the call is the logos. 
The connection between the root meaning of logos and a call or a sung reci-
tation supports this argument. This is not to say that logos cannot also mean 
word, speech, or assertion, but that in Fragment B50, the logos operates as 
a call. Homologein is translated in this fragment as “agree” “agreement,” or 
“say accordingly.” In this call and response scenario, homologein refers to the 
responding logos by the listeners, saying together: “All is one.” Heraclitus 
advises listeners to respond “all is one” as the speaker completes his call. 
The listeners respond together with the speaker. 
According to Smitherman, call and response seeks to synthesize speakers 
and listeners in a unified movement, embodying communality rather than 
individuality. Individual roles, however, are important, as calls are issued 
from individuals to a group of responding speakers.59 Paul Gilroy describes 
an “ethics of antiphony,” in which the performer becomes one with the 
audience, establishing a relationship of identity.60 Gilroy’s theory is not a 
reduction in which all players are the same. Performer and audience are not 
identical in this scenario. Hersch tells us in West African culture, art blurs the 
distinction between artist and audience, “making listeners as much a part of 
the performance as the musicians themselves.” Therefore, art and community 
are inseparable and working in harmony.61
The antiphony in Heraclitus Fragment B50 is a unity of opposites, in which 
call and response are connected in harmony. Though not disconnected, logos 
and homologein are in agreement and in variance at the same time. When 
logos is considered as a call, the difference between logos and homologein 
in fragment B50 is a movement between a call and a response. The different 
voices are opposed in antiphony, yet connected in harmony. 
Interpreters of Heraclitean logos, such as Kirk, assert Heraclitus founds 
logos upon the unity of opposites. In listening to the logos as fragment B50 
relates, explains Wheelright, logos “is at once other than and yet one with the 
individual self.”62 In my reading of the fragment, it is the logos and homolo-
gein that are at variance. Heraclitus delineates a scene in which the calling, 
responding and saying together create opposition and harmony. 
In existing interpretations, what connects fragments B50 and B51 is an 
“opposite tension” that at once draws things apart in different directions and 
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maintains balance. This balance or “hidden harmony” keeps things together 
and apart at the same time.63 Vlastos refers to a principle of hidden harmony 
as well, citing fragment 54, “An unapparent connection is stronger. . .than 
one which is obvious.”64
In my interpretation of fragments B50 and B51, harmony is neither hidden 
nor unapparent. Like fragment B50, I read B51 about the bow and lyre as an 
ongoing dialogue between differing things that move in harmony. In B50, a 
“hearkening attunement” denotes harmony of opposites. Similarly, “palintro-
pos harmonie” in B51 refers to the coming together of movement in opposite 
directions. In B51, a back-and-forth movement in opposite directions works 
in harmony much like the varying call and response works in B50.
HARMONY
Hippolytus cites Heraclitus fragment B51 in Refutation of All Heresies, Book 
9. Robinson states this as follows:65
They do not understand how, while differing from (or: being at variance) (it) 
is in agreement with itself. (There is) a back-turning connection, like (that) of 
a bow or lyre.
And in Briggman’s version of the same fragment from Hippolytus:6667
[People] do not understand how, what is diverse. . .is in agreement. . .with 
itself: a back-turning harmony. . .like that of the bow and lyre. 
The back-turning connection or harmony in these readings is translated 
from palintropos harmonie. In Greek, palintropos or “back-turning” also 
means contrary or “changing in the opposite direction.”68 Mention in Frag-
ment B51 of the phrase, “back-turning harmony” conjures the image of a lyre 
that is played with a strung bow.69 This is contrary to most interpretations that 
see the bow as representing a weapon used to shoot arrows and the lyre as 
the strings of the lyre.70 When referring to “the bow and the lyre” and a back-
turning connection and harmony, I believe Heraclitus is speaking about the 
bowed lyre rather than a plucked lyre. With the bowed lyre, the bow moves in 
two opposite directions, thus exhibiting a back-and-forth movement indica-
tive of the unity of opposites. In oppositions, “the former by their changing 
become the latter, and the latter in turn are changed and become the former.”71 
“Any one thing following a given line of change will be found to turn in the 
opposite way sooner or later.”72Gregory Vlastos73posits opposites are not 
differences, but the same thing with “modifications.” In Vlastos’ “sameness 
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of opposites,” the bow would move in the same way across the lyre in each 
different direction. This movement of change in direction of the bowing is 
what he would call a modification. In Fragment B51, I see the modification 
as the palintropos or back-turning—a movement that is not one direction or 
its opposite, but the coming together of their change in direction. 
Similarly, the dialogue in Fragment B50 is also a palintropos harmonie, in 
which logos is a facet of two-way discourse or dialogue, and not a monologue 
to be heard. This entails connection between the call of the response of the 
other. The call comes, is listened to, and then is responded to. The response 
is then listened to and the call comes again, and so on. 
ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
In the scenario put forth in Heraclitus Fragment B50, homologein refers to 
the saying together of the response, hen panta, meaning “all is one” or “all 
things are one.” I argue this phrase expresses harmony and connectedness. 
The meaning of panta is “all things” or “the universe.” Hen, considered 
panta’s counter-concept, means “the one.”74 Vlastos considers the double role 
of “one” in Heraclitus’s “unity of opposites” theory, “It is itself one of the 
opposites, yet it explains the unity in all opposites, it is both one among the 
many and the one which is the many.”75
In most existing interpretations, such as Jaspers’s and Burnet’s, Hera-
clitus’s theory of the unity of opposites, the coming together of opposites 
in struggle is conveyed through logos.76 Nietzsche, in his early work, also 
interprets not just polarity in the unity of opposites, but an eternal war of 
opposites.77 A thing diverges into two independent opposing things that con-
stantly try to reunite. “A quality is set continually at variance with itself and 
separates itself into its opposites: these opposites continually strive again one 
towards another.”78
Heraclitus profoundly influenced Marx and Hegel, who concentrate on a 
dialectics based on contradicting thesis and antithesis. Out of this conflict 
comes synthesis. Jaspers goes further to say the whole of Western dialectic 
traces its roots to Heraclitus and the pre-Socratic philosophers that came after 
Parmenides and Anaximander.79
In Nietzsche’s interpretation of the unity of opposites, things are at variance 
with themselves. In this scenario, inward tension and harmony create a tug of 
war in which each side has a turn gaining dominance over the other. Nietzsche’s 
reading responds to the problem of Becoming that he identifies in pre-Platonic 
philosophy80 beginning with Anaximander. “Out of the war of opposites all 
Becoming originates; . . .momentary predominance of the one fighter, but with 
that the war is not at an end; the wrestling continues to all eternity.”81
Enroth and Brommesson_9781783484720.indb   109 28-07-2015   15:59:56
110 Carrie Giunta
In his Heraclitus lecture at the University of Basel in the 1870s, Nietzsche 
concentrates on fragment B51. In Nietzsche’s reading of fragment B51, 
diverging parts must turn back on themselves.82
For Heraclitus, “back-turning” is when anything moving in a given line of 
change will eventually turn in the opposite way.83 Tension keeps this move-
ment turning in opposite directions. This is what Hegel and Nietzsche refer 
to as Heraclitus’s Becoming. In my reading, however, the bow and the lyre 
do not form synthesis out of antithesis, but harmony out of a back-turning 
change in direction. If it were a struggle between opposing sides, then there 
would not be harmony, but domination of one over the other. 
In his early writings, Nietzsche contemplates Becoming out of oppositional 
struggle. Writing later in Human All-Too-Human, A Book for Free Spirits 
(1886), he argues things are not opposites, but different modes. Whereas 
Marx and Hegel’s reading of Heraclitus supports their dialectics, in which 
truth and Becoming come out of contradiction, Nietzsche develops out of 
Heraclitus, his theory of eternal Becoming and harmony. 
In my interpretation, the state of constant back-turning and flux that Hera-
clitus bases on the unity of opposites does not indicate a dialectics. Nor does 
it refer to internal conflict. I argue fragments B50 and 51 do not describe a 
battle of opposing things or ideas, but of continuous movement in opposite 
directions via palintropos harmonie or back-turning agreement. Heraclitus 
fragments that contain his unity of opposites theme illustrate a palintropos 
harmonie. 
In this reading, the fragments are relational and diunital. For instance, in 
fragment B50, the call and response are intertwined and separate at the same 
time. They are not polarities in conflict, as a back-turning of each call and 
response keeps them in harmony much like the movement in fragment B51, 
in which the harmonie of the bow and lyre work through palintropos. If the 
bow did not turn back in palintropos and instead carried on in the same direc-
tion, it would not produce harmonie.84
In the second part of fragment B50, homologein hen panta is an instruction 
to listeners and speakers to say something together all as one. This is much 
like the “A-men” in the call and response of the gospel church, as Smither-
man discusses. In call and response, speakers and listeners seek “a state of 
balance or harmony, which,” she argues, “is fundamental to the traditional 
African world view.”85
These notions of antiphony and harmony have similarities with the cul-
ture of ubuntu, in which all people are interdependent, or “A person is a 
person through other persons.”86 The meaning behind ubuntu is umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu, which translates to, “Each individual’s humanity is 
ideally expressed in relationship with others, and, in turn, individuality 
is truly expressed.”87 Does the phrase, hen panta “all is one” recall some 
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traditional African worldviews such as ubuntu, which are based on balance 
and harmony?88
The antiphonic dialogue and harmony that I interpret in this fragment 
points toward a joint interest in philosophy and shared common knowledge 
among pre-Socratic scholars of Greece and Egypt. This rules in the existance 
of a transnational philosophical community in the work of pre-Socratics such 
as Heraclitus that was Egyptian and Greek at the same time.
SQUARE CIRCLES
What constitutes African worldview or philosophy is a much debated and 
politically weighted topic of discussion. There are thousands of cultures in 
Africa, which makes isolating an African worldview out of these problematic 
and risks cultural essentialism. Stephen C. Ferguson II, however, contests 
this: “Though we speak of Greek philosophy, German philosophy, and even 
American philosophy, Africana philosophy is seen as a semantic monstrosity 
bordering on self-contradiction.”89 The idea of African philosophy, Ferguson 
says is received as “sort of like a square circle.”90 Yet, phrases such as “Euro-
pean philosophy” and “Western philosophy,” which are no less broad and 
general, are adequately received.91
The aim of this chapter is not to exoticize or to generalize. African philoso-
phy is not an essential idea of what it means to be African. Have past tendencies 
to form generalizations and to promote negative stereotypes attached to 
African cultures caused “African philosophy” to be considered essentialist, 
whereas “European philosophy” is very widely and unapologetically applied? 
This avoidance of discussion of philosophical thought connected to Africa, 
I argue is in effect epistemic violence.92 The proscription of any discussion of 
a particular branch of philosophical thought is a form of epistemic violence 
that ultimately wrecks knowledge of ways of understanding. 
This knowledge, as revealed here, is essential to a Western philosophical 
tradition in which early Greek philosophy was not conceived in isolation, 
but via close contact with Egyptian scholars. To deem discussions of African 
philosophical thought as mere essentialism is to eschew a relation between 
Greek and Egyptian scholars and what knowledge they shared.
As I have cited Olela as saying, ways of knowing moved through sub-
Saharan Africa to Egypt.93 An indigenous African worldview paradigm 
emphasizes harmony, interrelationship, connectedness, and connection to 
nature and to each other.94 Spirit and matter are connected. There is inter-
relation and not separation. In a European worldview paradigm, humans 
are separate, distinct individuals.95 Knowledge of the universe means one is 
separated from it. There is compartmentalization, control, and materialism.96 
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This opposition, however, and the very language describing this paradigmatic 
split are based on separation. 
Definitions that attempt to explain African worldview, as author R. 
Sambuli Mosha argues in The Heartbeat of Indigenous Africa, are pointless 
because the use of divisive words and phrases such as religion, spirituality, 
and politics implies that “each of these is a separate entity that can be viewed, 
studied, and even lived independently of the others.”97 Mosha means life is an 
integrated experience with no place for distinctions and compartmentalization 
because “all aspects of life and universe are interconnected and interdepen-
dent.”98 Mosha manages to clarify the two perspectives without crystallizing 
a distinction. The harmony, interrelationship, and connectedness that Mosha 
describes are difficult to articulate. I believe the Heraclitus fragments dis-
cussed here do so elegantly, with no need for divisive or compartmentalizing 
terms. The fragments express this harmony using the song-related elements 
of call and response and group singing. 
Averring one should be cautious in ascribing different classifications to 
African culture, musicologist Simha Arom explains: “In Africa, mental cat-
egories are never as radical as they are in Western culture.”99 Categories may 
not be opposed to one another, necessarily. “Two categories may converge to 
the point where they overlap to some extent, cross each other, reinforce each 
other, rather than exclude each other.”100 I hold that European philosophy 
is not as separated as the paradigm prescribes. In order to understand this, 
more research should be undertaken on the common communication shared 
among philosophers around the fifth century BC in Greece and Egypt. Greek 
philosophy and Egyptian philosophy are not necessarily separate single iden-
tities, nor are they intertwined differences forming a hybrid tradition. In this 
case, a transnational community is not based on identity, unity, or difference, 
but on a relation. In a diunital relation, as I have discussed, the foundation of 
philosophy can be Greek and Egyptian at the same time. Greece and Egypt 
formed a transnational community, not a single identity or unity and not as 
two separate or intertwined single identities, but a community of philosophers 
that was Egyptian and Greek at the same time. 
Robert Bernasconi suggests in an essay entitled, “African Philosophy’s 
Challenge to Continental Philosophy,”101 “Continental philosophers should be 
opened to critique from African philosophy. They would ‘learn more about 
their own tradition seen from ‘the outside’.”102 Researching the links between 
ancient Greek philosophy and African philosophy could help philosophers 
today to achieve greater understanding of our own tradition. Likewise, Chan-
cellor Williams sees Greek texts as a rich source for this connection. Wil-
liams commends early Greek writers “who had included much of our ancient 
history with their own and passed it down through the centuries.”103 Think-
ing this way about pre-Socratic philosophy can add to our understanding 
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of European philosophy by considering a broader picture in terms of how 
ancient Greek philosophy was influenced and inspired by Egyptian thinkers.
Can we dismiss Egyptian pre-Socratic philosophers on the grounds that 
they did not produce written texts?104 Early Greek philosophers such as 
Heraclitus and Socrates did not write. As philosophers of that time wrote 
nothing, all we have are accounts written by later ancient Greek thinkers 
like Plato and Aristotle, who refer to Heraclitus and Socrates in their work. 
Without written evidence of the pre-Socratics’ work, theirs would have been 
an oral tradition like the Egyptians’. Reading the pre-Socratics in a new way 
that can reveal a transnational philosophical community not based on national 
or continental identity. In this way, ancient Greek philosophy was Egyptian 
and Greek at the same time. 
CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have considered the accepted belief that philosophy origi-
nated in ancient Greece, supported by the argument that Greek philosophers 
happened to write down their ideas. A debate in the late 1980s and 90s 
between this Europe-centric view and an Africa-centric origin remains unre-
solved. I have argued ancient Greek philosophers might well have studied 
with Egyptian scholars, forming an African-European-Asian community of 
philosophers around the Mediterranean basin. Although I cannot solve the 
problem of the origin of philosophy here in this chapter, reading pre-Socratic 
works with this in mind and re-considering how African philosophies had 
an influence on these Greek authors, I instead suggest an alternative to what 
are called the “first philosophers.” In this alternative reading, I argued pre-
Socratic philosophy was Egyptian and Greek at the same time.
With a lack of remaining texts from Egypt in pre-Socratic time, the role of 
Egyptian scholars in early Greek thinking has not been discussed in interpre-
tations of pre-Socratic thinkers. I have argued for neither an Africa-centric 
nor a Europe-centric origin of philosophy. By examining the surviving 
pre-Socratic literature, such as Heraclitus fragments, I have developed an 
interpretation that has not previously been considered. This research reveals 
some fragments allude to a musical background in Heraclitus, evident in 
Fragment B50 for example, in which antiphonic and harmonic motifs emerge. 
Such themes connect with themes from African philosophies like ubuntu, 
suggesting that both a purely European and a purely African origin are false. 
This also supersedes a theory of hybridity in which separate identities are 
enmeshed. In my interpretation, these ancient philosophical texts exhibit a 
connection that was Egyptian and Greek at the same time based not on divi-
sive categories such as national or continental identities, but on a transnational 
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relation. In this close reading of Heraclitus fragments, an oral, musical con-
nection implies a different relation that has been overlooked—one in which 
Greek philosophy did not develop either in isolation or in hybridity, but in a 
transnational philosophical community.
Arguments for an exclusively European or African history of philosophy 
turn a blind eye to possibilities of community on a global scale. Before the 
late 1700s, philosophy from non-European parts of the world existed in har-
mony with European philosophy.105 This idea of global community in ancient 
Europe did not survive the eighteenth century.106 The history of philosophy 
became the exclusive story of Europe, the Greeks and the West. This mono-
genealogical history of philosophy is upheld today.
My reading of Heraclitus implies that coinciding with nineteenth-century 
imperialism, an obsession with oppositional struggle and separation obscured 
the harmony and diunital relation Heraclitus was speaking about in the frag-
ments. In light of this reading, modern theorists of global community could 
consider points in the past when history was recast to exclude whole parts of 
the world, thereby closing off the possibility of global community. 
The concept of global community in a philosophical context challenges 
the restricted vision of philosophers who fail to see more than one conti-
nent—Europe.107 Overcoming these barriers would give philosophy a fuller 
understanding of its very own tradition.
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